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IN THE 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
STANTON TRANSPORTATION 
COMPANY, a corporation, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
CONTINENTAL EMSCO COM-
pANY, a division of YOUNGS-
TOWN SHEET AND TUBE COM-
PANY, a corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MARVIN DAVIS, JACK DAVIS, 
JEAN DAVIS and JOAN PRES-
TON, partners, doing business 
under the firm name of DAVIS OIL 
COMPANY, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
Case No. 
8951 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
In this Brief the procedure adopted by Plaintiff and 
Appellant for the designation of the parties and others 
will be followed. Stanton Transportation Company will 
sometimes be referred to as "Stanton"; Continental Em-
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sco will sometimes be referred to as "Emsco"; Davis Oil 
Company and its partners will sometimes be referred to 
as "Davis"; and Walker and Wilson Drilling Company 
will sometimes be referred to as "Walker-Wilson" or as 
"driller". The following abbreviations will be used; "R" 
for the Clerk's files; "TRA" for the transcript of the 
hearing of September 20, 1957, and "TRB" for the 
transcript of the hearing on November 5 and 6, 1957. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellant's Statement of Facts is inadequate and 
in some respects misleading. 
Stanton is a common carrier, operating under Certi-
ficate No. 9787 issued by the Interstate Commerce Com-
mission, and is primarily engaged in the hauling of oil 
field equipment and supplies. Prior to the events lead-
ing to this case, Stanton had hauled oil and gas well 
drilling rigs for Walker and Wilson Drilling Company 
3 or 4 times over a period of about 2 years. ( TRA 7-8, 
30-31) The relationship between Walker-Wilson and 
Stanton was governed by published tariffs on file with 
the Interstate Conunerce Commission. (TRA 8-9) 
In Appellant's Staten1ent of Facts (pages 3 and 
4 of its Brief) are statements which erroneously suggest 
and imply that Davis and the driller contracted for 
transportation to the drill site of the particular drilling 
rig that was used. 
'fhere is nothing whatsoever in the record to sup-
port those state1nents. No reference of any kind is made 
in the contract to either the particular drilling rig or its 
location at the time the contract was executed. :Moreover, 
under questioning by Stanton's counsel, ~!arvin Davis 
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testified, and his testimony is uncontradicted, that he 
was not "informed as to the whereabouts of the drilling 
rig that would be used by Walker and Wilson Drilling 
Company to drill this well", and that he did not discuss 
this matter with the officers of Walke-r-Wilson. (TRB 23) 
In essence the drilling contract provided that 
vValker-Wilson would drill the oil and gas well and 
Davis would pay for the well. Attached to the contract 
was a Schedule "A" checklist of items to be furnished 
by each of the parties, and a Schedule "B" which de-
signated the operations to be performed by each party. 
Paragraph 4 of the contract in part provided: 
4. In full compensation to Contractor [drill-
er] for compliance with the terms of this contract, 
furnishing the items designated in said Schedule 
"A", and performing the operations designated 
in Schedule "B" hereof, shall pay the Contractor 
the sum computed under said Sc4edule- "B" on 
the following rates: • • • 
d/ For all operations designated therein by 
mark "X" in the column entitled "FOOTAGE 
DRILLING RATE", the sum of $8.25 per EACH 
LINEAL FOOT OF HOLE DRILLED. 
Among the operations for which the driller was to 
be compensated at the rate of $8.25 per lineal foot of 
hole drilled were the following: moving in equipment, 
rigging up, drilling and reaming surface hole, drilling 
full sized hole, moving out. Among the items designated 
in Schedule "A" to be furnished by the driller, for 
which $8.25 per lineal foot constituted the consideration, 
were the following: complete unitized draw works with 
two engines & sand reel, mud pumps, mud storage' tanks, 
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mud testing equipment, fuel (butane, diesel oil, etc.) & 
storage, rig mats and installation, rat hole installed, 
water and water line to 50' from well site, water storage 
tanks, cranes and trucks for moving in and rigging up, 
cranes and trucks for tearing down and moving out, weld-
ing on rigging up, portable generator (30 K'V), rig 
wiring and lights, drilling mast & substructure, running 
supplies & oils and greases. 
At the drill site Stanton's employees erected the 
rig. (TRA 13, 22, 34) For these services its charges 
were $1,244.50. Walter Utzinger, President of Stanton, 
testified that these were "freight charges" just as were 
the charges for actual transportation. His testimony 
in this connection was as follows: 
A. I'd like to explain that freight charges. 
A lot of this freight charges are essential to the 
transportation. In fact all of the1n are. They are 
for, they are all freight charges. Even though 
they show hourly rates, they are in performance 
either in origin or destination for setting the 
equipment that has been transported, and are still 
transported materials and related to the trans-
portation, and therefore, they are regulated by 
the Interstate Commerce Conunission and if they 
weren't then they would be subject to- * • • 
Q. What I was referring to was that some 
of these were for freight charges, that is trans-
portation, Inoving the rig, and son1e of them I 
believe you testified were for setting the rig in 
place after it was moved on to the location. 
A. Still part of the transportation. (TRA 
33-34) • 
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Stanton's charges for the transportation of the rig totaled 
$10,984.64. 
The trial court found that the charges of $10,984.64 
for actual transportation and $1,244.50 for erecting the 
drilling rig were fair and reasonable for the labor and 
work performed and were made "in accordance with the 
tariffs of Stanton Transportation Company lawfully 
on file with the Interstate Commerce Commission" (R. 
80). The court concluded that Stanton was not entitled 
to recover the sum of $10,984.64 representing charges 
for transporting the rig to the well site becaus~ "Such 
charges are not lienable and do not constitute the 
performance of work or the furnishing of materials for 
the prospecting, developing, preservation or working 
of an oil and gas well" (R. 83). The court concluded that 
Stanton was entitled to recover the sum of $1,2·44.50 
"representing charges for labor and work performed in 
erecting the drilling rig" ( R. 82). 
STATEMENT OF POINTS RELIED ON 
POINT I 
FREIGHT CHARGES FOR TRANSPORTING 
DRILLING RIG ARE NOT LIENABLE UNDER 
OUR MECHANICS' LIEN STATUTE. 
(a) Construction of Statute 
(b) Legislative History of Statute 
POINT II 
THE CONTRACT BETWEEN DAVIS AND THE 
DRILLER DID NOT COVER .TRANSPORTA~ 
TION CHARGES. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
-6-
POINT III 
CHARGES FOR TRANSPORTATION OF 
EQUIPMENT SUCH AS A DRILLING RIG ARE 
NOT LIENABLE UNDER MECHANICS' LIEN 
LAWS. 
POINT I 
FREIGHT CHARGES FOR TRANSPORTING 
DRILLING RIG ARE NOT LIENABLE UNDER 
OUR MECHANICS' LIEN STATUTE 
(a) Construction of Statute 
While Section 68-3-2, UCA 1953, provides that the 
statutes of Utah should be "liberally construed with a 
view to effect the objects of the statutes and to promote 
justice", it should be remembered that mechanic's liens 
are purely statutory, not contractual, and that where 
the statute fails, courts cannot create rights and should 
not do so by unnatural and forced construction. Eccles 
Lumber Co. v. Martin, 31 U. 241, 87 Pac. 713. As was 
stated by this Court in the case of Park City ... Ueat Co., 
et al. vs. Comstock Silver King Mining Co., et al., 36 U. 
145, 103 Pac. 253 : 
All courts agree that these liens are the mere 
creatures of s01ne statute, and that unless the 
provisions of the particular statute creating the 
liens are substantially ron1plied with no lien is 
acquired. 
r_rhe rules for construing 111echanic's lien statutes are 
stated in 36 Am. J ur. Mechanics' Liens, Sections 11, 12 
and 13, as follows : 
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Sec. 11. Generally.-Mechanics' lien ·statutes 
are construed in accordance with the general rules 
of statutory construction. Thus, such statutes are 
to be construed as a whole, so that each provision 
may be in harmony with every other, and the 
remedial purposes of the law preserved. • • * 
Sec. 12. Strict or Liberal Construction.-Al-
though in some jurisdictions mechanics' lien sta-
tutes are given a strict construction as being in 
derogation of the common law, the general rule 
is that such statutes, being remedial, should be 
liberally construed in order to carry out the pur-
poses of their enactment. As to the provisions 
of the statutes which are not remedial, however, 
the majority of courts are inclined to a strict con-
struction. Even remedial provisions of the statutes 
are not given such a liberal interpretation as will 
unsettle or destroy the rights of third persons 
which have intervened. Nor will the rule of liberal 
construction permit a claim to be sustained when 
that can be done only by a forced and unnatural 
interpretation of the language of the statute. 
Furthermore, although a mechanic's lien is said 
to be a favorite of the law, a statute cannot be so 
extended to be applied to cases which do not fall 
within its provisions. • • • 
Sec. 13-A.s to Classes of Persons, Nature of 
Improvement, and Property Covered by Lien.-
According to the weight of authority, mechanic's 
lien statutes are strictly construed as to the class 
or classes of persons who may assert the right 
to such a lien, the nature of improvements for 
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which a lien may attach, and the kind of property 
on which it may be fastened. ~ • "' 
(b) Legislative History of Statute 
When the statutes of Utah were revised in 1933 
. ' Sectwns 3722, 3731, 3732 and 37 4 7, of the Compiled Laws 
of 1917 were condensed into what became Section 52-1-3 
' Revised Statutes of 1933 and what is now Section 38-1-3 
' DCA 1953. So the Court can readily determine the effect 
of the 1933 revision we set out Section 38-1-3 in full and 
all material parts of Sections 3722, 3731, 3732 and 37 47. 
Words italicized in Section 38-1-3 were added in the 
revision. The language italicized in Sections 3722, 3731, 
3732 and 3747, was deleted when the 1933 revision was 
enacted. 
Section 38-1-3 UCA 1953 
38-1-3. Contractors, subcontractors and all 
persons performing labor upon, or furnishing 
materials to be used in, the construction or altera-
tion of, or addition to, or repair of, any building, 
structure or improvement upon land; all foundry 
men and boiler makers; all persons performing 
labor or furnishing materials for the construction, 
repairing or carrying on of any mill, manufactory 
or hoisting works; all persons who shall do work 
or furnish 1naterials for the prospecting, develop-
ment, preservation or working of any mining 
claim, mine, quarry, oil or gas u:ell, or deposit; and 
licensed architects and engineers and artisans who 
have furnished designs, plats, plans, n1aps, speci-
fications, drawings, estimates of cost, surveys or 
superintendence, or who have rendered other like 
professional service, or bestowed labor, shall have 
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a lien upon the property upon or concerning which 
they have rendered service, performed labor or 
furnished rnaterials, for the value of the service 
rendered, labor performed or materials furnished 
by each respectively, whether at the instance of 
the owner or of any other person acting by his 
authority as agent, contractor or otherwise. Such 
liens shall attach only to such interest as the owner 
may have in the property, but the interest of a 
lessee of a mining claim, mine or deposit, whether 
working under bond or otherwise, shall for the 
purposes of this chapter include products mined 
and excavated while the same remain upon the 
premises included within the lease. (All of the 
italicized words were added to the 1933 revision. 
The language following the first comma in the last 
sentence should be compared with Section 3732.) 
Sections 3722, 3731, 3732, and 3747, Compiled 
Laws of 1917. 
3722. Mechanics, materialmen, contractors, 
sub-contractors, builders, and all persons of every 
class performing labor upon or furnishing mater-
ials to be used in the construction, alteration, addi-
tion to, or repair, either in whole or in part, of any 
building, bridge, ditch, flume, aqueduct, tunnel, 
fence, railroad, wagon road, or other structure or 
improvement upon land, and also architects, en-
gineers, and artisans who have furnished designs, 
plats, plans, maps, specifications, drawings, esti-
mates of cost, surveys, or superintendence, or who 
have rendered other like professional service or 
bestowed labor in whole or part, describing, illus-
trating, or superintending such structure or work 
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done or to be done, or in any part connected there-
with, shall have a lien upon the property upon 
which they have rendered service, or performed 
labor, or furnished materials, for the value of such 
service rendered, labor done, or materials furnish-
ed, by each respectively, whether at the instance 
of the owner or of any other person acting by his 
authority or under him as agent, contractor, or 
otherwise; provided, that a lien or liens shall 
attach only to such interest as the owner or lessee 
may have in the real estate. (Italicized words do 
not appear in the 1933 revision.) 
3731. The provisions of this chapter shall 
apply to all persons who shall do work or furnish 
materials for the working, preservation, or de-
velopment of any mine, lode, mining claim, or de-
posit yielding metals or minerals of any kind, or 
for the working, preservation, or development of 
any such mine, lode, or deposit in search of such 
metals or minerals, and to all persons who shall 
work or furnish materials upon any shaft, tunnel, 
incline, adit, drift, drain, or other excavation of 
any such mine, lode, or deposit; * • • (Italicized 
words do not appear in the 1933 revision.) 
37 32. The next preceding section shall not be 
deemed to apply to the owner or owners of any 
»tine, lode deposit, shaft, tunnel, incline, adit, 
drift, or other excavation when the same shall be 
worked by a lessee, under bond or otherwise; but, 
in such case, persons entitled to a lien under this 
chapter shall have a lien on the leasehold interest 
and on the ores and 'mineral bearing rock or dirt 
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mined and excavated by the lessee. (Italicized 
words do not appear in the 1933 revision.) 
3747. All foundrymen and boilermakers and 
all persons performing labor or furnishing ma-
chinery, or boilers, or castings, or other material 
for the construction or repairing or carrying on of 
any mill, manufactory, or hoisting works shall have 
a lien on such mill, manufactory, or hoisting works, 
for such work or labor done on such machinery, or 
boiler, or castings, or other material furnished ,by 
each respectively. And all the provisions of this 
chapter respecting the 1node of filing, recording, 
securing, and enforcing the liens of contractors 
and others, and the word superstructure whenever 
it occurs in this chapter shall be applicable to the 
provisions of this section. (Italicized words do not 
appear in the 1933 revision.) 
The gist of Appellant's argument on pages 8 to 14 
of its brief is that the revised version of the mechanics' 
lien law (Section 52-1-3, Revised Statutes 1933) broad-
ened the previously enacted statutes to provide that work 
performed for the prospecting, development, preserva-
tion or working of an oil or gas well need· only concern 
the property involved and need not be done upon such 
property or for the prospecting, etc. of such . property. 
This was accomplished, it is argued, by the addition of 
the word "concerning" and the words "oil or gas well" 
in the revised statute. Because there is nothing in the 
revised statute to limit the applicability of the word 
"concerning" to liens for work done for the development 
of an oil or gas well (and Appellant makes no such con-
tention), Appellant's argument must be that ever since 
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1933 work performed by all persons named in the statute 
need only concern the property involved and need not be 
performed upon or for such property. 
It is our position that the word "concerning" has 
applicability only to liens given to architects, engineers 
and artisans. There being nothing indicating an inten-
tion to restrict applicability of the word to liens for 
work done for the development of oil or gas wells, we 
can test the soundness of Appellant's argument by apply-
ing the word to liens given to other persons named in 
the statute. If the word "concerning" was interpreted as 
applying to the persons first named in the statute the 
following conflict would be produced: Whereas the 
first part of the statute gives liens to contractors, sub-
contractors and all persons "performing labor upon, 
or furnishing n1aterials to be used in" (Emphasis added) 
the construction, etc. of any building, structure or im-
provement "upon land", the word "concerning" as con-
strued by Appellant would broaden the act to give liens 
to persons whose labor is not upon, and whose materials 
are not to be used in, but which only "concern" such 
properties. 
We submit that if the legislature had intended to 
make the sweeping change in the applicability of the 
statute, it would have done more to accomplish that result 
than to merely add the word "concerning" when the 
former statutes were condensed and revised. Realizing 
that it cannot base its case upon the mere addition of the 
word "concerning", the Appellant tries to establish that 
the legislature made other changes in 1933 which, it is 
argued, indicate an intent to "specifically provide that 
all persons who do work for the development of an oil 
well shall have a lien upon the property concerning which 
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they have performed the work" (See page 13 of its brief). 
In so trying to support its position, Appellant makes a 
number of erroneous statements or assumptions. At 
the top of page 11 of its Brief, it states that in "1933 
the statute was an1ended to give mechanics liens to all 
persons who shall do work or furnish materials for the 
prospecting, development, preservation or working of 
any mining claim, rnine, quarry, oil or gas well or de-
posit." Appellant ignores the fact that prior to 1933 
Section 3731, Compiled Laws of 1917, gave liens: 
***to all persons who shall do work or furnish 
materials for the working, preservation, or develop-
ment of any mine, lode, mining claim, or deposit 
yielding metals or minerals of any kind, or for 
the working, preservation, or development of any 
such mine, lode, or deposit in search of such metals 
or minerals, and to all persons who shall do work 
or furnish materials upon any shaft, tunnel, in-
cline, adit, drift, drain, or other excavation of any 
such mine, lode, or deposit; • • • 
On page 11 of its Brief, Appellant also erroneously 
states that "Prior to 1933, the statute gave liens only 
upon property upon which the parties named therein had 
rendered service, performed labor or furnished mater-
ials". Appellant overlooks the fact that prior to 1933 
liens were given to architects, engineers and artisans 
for furnishing designs, plats, plans, maps, drawings, etc. 
describing or illustrating "such structure or work done 
or to be done, or in any part connected therewith". (Sec-
tion 3722, Compiled Laws of 1917) The preparation of 
designs, plans and specifications certainly is not the 
performance of work or labor upon buildings or improve-
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ments, nor is the furnishing of such documents the 
furnishing of materials to be used in the properties. 
On page 12 of its Brief, Appellant argues about the 
meaning of the words "perform labor upon" and the 
words "shall do work for", and on page 13 concludes: 
"Again, it is no coincidence that these three changes 
appear together for the first time in 1933". It is not 
entirely clear what three changes Appellant means. Ap-
parently, it refers to (1) the extension of the statute to 
oil and gas well properties, (2) the claimed change of 
policy to give liens for work which merely "concern" 
property, and (3) a change in the language from "per-
form labor upon" to "do work for" with reference to 
development of oil or gas wells. A careful comparison 
of the statutes as they existed prior to 1933 and as they 
were condensed and revised will disclose that the words 
"do work or furnish materials for" were in the earlier 
statute with reference to 1nines and mining claims. 
A careful reading of the statutes will also disclose 
that there has been no broadening of the statute except 
to give liens to persons who work for, or furnish materials 
for, the development of oil or gas wells and quarries. 
Certainly there has ·been no broadening or extension of 
the statute to give liens to all persons, regardless of the 
classifications set out in the statute, who perform work 
or furnish materials which Inerely "concern" properties. 
The difficulty with Appellanfs whole argument is that 
it is based on the entirely false pre1nise that the legisla-
ture, by using the words "upon or concerning which". 
jntended to broaden the definitions of all classifications of 
persons entitled to liens. Properly construed, the words 
"upon or concerning which'' constitute a general descrip-
tion of the types or kinds of work and services performed 
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by the various classes of persons described in the statute 
~work done upon buildings by contractors, services per-
formed by architects and engineers with respect to, or 
"concerning" buildings or other improvements, etc. 
Some comparisons of statutory provisions will illus-
trate our contention that the legislature did not intend 
to broaden the classifications of persons entitled to liens 
other than to give liens to persons who worked or fur-
nished materials for the development of quarries and 
oil and gas wells. 
1. Prior to 1933 Section 3722 gave a lien to 
contractors etc. who performed labor ~tpon, or 
furnished materials to be used in buildings, etc. 
There was no change in this classification in the 
revision which still provides that "contractors • • • 
and all persons performing labor upon, or furnish-
ing materials to be used in, the construction • • * 
of any building, structure or improvement upon 
land" shall have a lien. Despite this specific 
language, Appellant would relate the word "con-
cerning" back to this definition and broaden it to 
include contractors, etc. whose labor or materials 
merely "concerned" such buildings. We submit 
that this classification has not been broadened. 
2. Prior to 1933 Section 3722 gave a lien to 
architects and engineers who furnished drawings, 
plans, specifications, etc., or superintendence or 
who rendered other like professional services or 
bestowed labor "in whole or part, describing, il-
lustrating, or superintending such structure or 
work done or to be done, or in any part connected 
therewith". The only change of any significance 
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with reference to this classification was that the· 
legislature deleted the awkward and ambiguous 
words quoted above. The classification of archi-
tects, engineers and artisans entitled to liens is 
the same under both statutes. 
3. Prior to 1933 Section 3731 gave liens to all 
persons who did work or furnished materials for 
the working, preservation or development of any 
mine, mining claim or deposit. The revised statute 
gives liens to all persons "who shall do work or 
furnish materials for the prospecting, develop-
ment, preservation or working of any mining 
claim, mine, quarry, oil or gas well, or deposit. 
The 1933 revision deleted language referring to 
mines or mining claims "yielding metals" and 
those "in search of such metals". Except for the 
addition of the words "quarry, oil or gas well" 
the revised provision is essentially the same as 
that which was in Section 3731 before 1933. With 
reference to the addition of the words "quarry, 
oil or gas well" it should be pointed out that in 
1933 Section 3736, Compiled Laws of 1917, was 
not similarly changed. That provision is now Sec-
tion 38-1-7, UCA 1953. It provides that original 
contractors and other persons must file their 
claims for record within certain periods after 
"performance of any labor in, or furnishing any 
materials for, any 1nine or mining claim. Regard-
less of the significance of the failure to extend 
the wording of Section 3736 to cover work on oil 
or gas wells, it seems obvious that the revision 
of 1933 did not broaden the classification of per-
sons entitled to liens for work in developing mines 
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(and oil or gas wells) so far as the question 
whether the work had to be done for or upon the 
properties concerned or need only "concern" such 
properties. 
As previously noted, the words "upon or concerning 
which" constitute a general description of the types or 
kinds of work required to be performed by the several 
classes of persons entitled to liens. The statute might just 
as well have provided that each of the classes of persons 
therein described shall have a lien upon the property 
"involved" and eliminate at this point in the statute a 
general description of the types of work or services 
performed. 
POINT II 
THE CONTRACT BETWEEN DAVIS AND THE 
DRILLER DID NOT COVER TRANSPORTA-
TION CHARGES 
Transportation of the rig from the site where the 
driller had last used it, or where the driller had it stored, 
to the drill site was not a subject about which Davis 
and the driller contracted. Marvin Davis' uncontradicted 
testimony was that he was not "informed as to the where-
abouts of the drilling rig that would be used by Walker 
and Wilson Drilling Company to drill this well", and 
that he did not discuss that matter with Walker-Wilson. 
(TRB 23). 
The distance that Walker-Wilson had to have the 
rig transported had no bearing whatsoever upon what 
Davis agreed to pay for drilling the well. For all that 
Davis knew, the driller might have had a rig on the 
immediately adjoining property-or it might have been 
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1000, or more, miles away. Transportation charges for 
hauling the rig from some near or distant point to the 
drill site was not an element considered by the parties 
in agreeing upon a price of $8.25 per lineal foot of hole 
drilled. Among the drilling operations which the driller 
agreed to perform, for which he was to receive the com-
pensation of $8.25 per lineal foot drilled, were: "Moving 
in equipment", "rigging up", "drilling and reaming sur-
face hole", "drilling full size hole", "reaming and con-
ditioning hole for formation test", etc., etc., and "moving 
out". (Schedule "B" of the Contract, Plaintiffs Exhibit 
No. 37) 
To move in equipment does not mean to transport 
it from some distant undisclosed location. To move it 
out does not mean to transport the equipment to some 
distant undisclosed location. At most those terms mean 
moving the rig onto and off the particular property where 
the drill site was located. 
This Court in the case of Morris on, M erril <t Co. v. 
H. W. Willard d!; W. E. Stewart and J. B. Clayton, 17 
Utah 306, 311, 53 Pac. 832, pointed out that: 
The extent of the right of the subcontractor 
under his lien will depend upon the original con-
tract between the owner and the contractor. 
The contract between Davis and the driller not having 
1nade any provision for the pay1nent of transportation 
charges for hauling the drilling equipment, the Appellant 
has no lien for such charges. 
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POINT III 
CHARGES FOR TRANSPORTATION OF EQUIP-
MENT SUCH AS A DRILLING RIG ARE NOT 
LIENABLE UNDER MECHANICS' LIEN LAWS 
Our position in this regard may be briefly stated: 
it is, that charges made by a common carrier for trans-
porting a drilling rig from a distant point to the site of its 
use are not items which will sustain a mechanic's lien 
in the absence of a statute specifically providing therefor. 
This position is supported in the Texas decision of 
Gray v. Magdalina Oil Co., 240 S.W. 693, wherein it was 
held that one who had hauled a "string of oil well tools, 
machinery and casing for the drilling of an oil well" 
was not entitled to such a lien. In construing the general 
mechanic's lien statute, Art. 5621, Rev. Civil Statutes, the 
court said on page 694 of 240 S.W.: 
The statute does not appear to provide a lien 
upon anything hauled, but the person who labors 
or furnishes material, etc., to erect any house or 
improvements, etc., shall have a lien on such house, 
lot, or lots connected therewith, etc., to secure the 
payment for the labor done, etc. ; so for this 
reason he has no lien. 
On motion for rehearing it was also said: 
Appellant in motion for rehearing suggests 
that the opinion is based upon article 5621, Re-
vised Civil Statutes, when it should be based upon 
article 5639a. We are of the opinion that no lien 
exists under either article, under the facts of this 
case. 
-·----
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This action is against the owner of the well 
machinery, as shown by the original opinion. The 
owner of the oil, gas, etc., wells is not a party, but, 
if it had been, the same construction of article 
5639a applies. See McClellan v. Haley et al., 237 
S.W. 627, and authorities there cited. 
The statute last referred to, i.e. 5639a, as material 
here and as set forth in Duty v. Texas-Cushing Oil ct 
Development Co., 242 S.W. 495, 497, is as follows: 
Any person • • • laborer, or mechanic, who 
shall, under contract express or implied, with the 
owner of any • • • gas, oil or mineral leasehold 
interest in land, or the owner of any gas pipe 
line or oil pipe line, or owner of any oil or gas 
pipe line right of way, or with the trustee, agent 
or receiver of any such owner, perform labor or 
furnish material • • • used in the digging, drilling, 
torpedoing, operating, completing, maintaining 
or repairing any such oil or gas well • • • shall 
have a lien on the whole of such land or leasehold 
interest therein • • • 
It can hardly be said that the terminology used in the 
Texas statute, i.e., labor in "digging, drilling, torpedoing, 
operating, completing, maintaining or repairing" is sub-
ject to more restricted interpretation so as to include less 
than "prospecting, development, preservation or work-
ing" of any oil or gas well as used in the pertinent Utah 
statute. 
Since the Gray case the Texas legislature has am-
Inended the statute to provide for mechanic's liens aris-
ing from transportation charges. Art. 5473, Chapter 3, 
Title 90, Vernon's Annotated Civil Statutes of Texas, as 
material here provides : 
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Any person • * * who shall * * * perform 
labor, furnish or haul material, machinery or 
supplies used in digging, drilling, torpedoing, 
operating, completing, maintaining or repairing 
any such oil or gas well • • ~ shall have a lien on 
the whole of such land or leasehold interest 
therein * • " 
The same is true in Kansas where it is provided by 
Section 213, Chapter 55, General Statutes of Kansas 1935, 
;hat: 
Any person who transports or hauls oil-field 
equipment under express contract with the owner 
or operator of any gas or oil leasehold interest in 
real property, or the owner or operator of any gas 
pipe line or oil pipe line or the owner of any oil-
field equipment and material, • • • shall have a 
lien upon the interest of such owner in the oil-
field equipment so transported and hauled. Said 
lien shall include, in addition to the charge for 
hauling or transporting, labor performed, or ma-
terials used and expended in the transporting, 
erecting, dismantling, loading and unloading of 
any oil-field machinery, equipment or supplies 
hauled or transported and shall be of equal stand-
ing with the contractor's lien provided by Section 
55-207 of the General Statutes of 1935. 
This legislation we believe is indicative of and in 
itself supports the theory which we here propound-that 
a special statute is necessary before leasehold interests 
may be subjected to mechanic's liens arising from trans-
portation charges. Cf. Green v. Hawkins & Antoon, La., 
142 So. 742. 
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The case relied upon by Appellants in this regard 
Cleveland v. Hightower, 108 Okla. 84, 234 Pac. 614, which 
has since been followed in that jurisdiction, held that 
under the statute extending liens to "Any labor in con-
structing or putting together any of the machinery used 
in drilling • • • any [oil well or] gas well" gave to one 
who with a team had hauled casing a distance of nine 
miles the status of a laborer and hence entitled to a lien 
for casing used in and which formed a part of the well. 
To bolster its position as supposedly supported by 
this Oklahoma decision, Appellant cites Cashman v. 
Russell, 33 Ariz. 451, 265 Pac. 606, which involved the 
hauling of "groceries, lumber, powder, oil, steel, ma-
chinery, hay, barley, etc. to the mines as needed in their 
operation" and in extending a lien to such services the 
opinion specifically excluded in distinguishing Santa Fe, 
P. & P. Ry. Co. v. Arizona Smelting Co., 13 Ariz. 95, 108 
P. 256, and by citing with apparent approval Union Trac-
tion Co. v. Kansas Casualty & Surety Co., 112 Kan. 774, 
213 Pac. 169, any question which might arise with respect 
to a common carrier. Also cited is Hill v. Twin Falls, etc., 
22 Idaho 27 4, 125 Pac. 204, wherein one hauling cement 
actually used in the construction of a dam was entitled 
to a lien for his services .. · The very quotation which is 
taken from this decision and appears in Appellant's brief 
on page 19 discloses the theory of that case to be that 
one hauling materials actually consumed in a construction 
thereby enhancing its value is entitled to a lien. Finally, 
a number of cases are cited on page 20 of the brief to the 
point that a 1nechanic's lien for transportation has been 
allowed when forming a part of the cost of the materials 
transported. 
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In the first place it cannot be said that these cases 
:tate what can be referred to as the uniformly accepted, 
1r even the majority, rule. See In re Kent Refining Co., 
~0 Fed. Supp. 662, Williamson v. Hotel Melrose, 110 S.C . 
. , 96 S.E. 407, 416, Thomas v. Commonwealth, 215 Mass. 
~69, 102 N.E. 428, and 57 C.J.S., pg. 540, Mechanics' Liens, 
;ection 50. But be that as it may, we believe that a mere 
>erusal of the authorities cited in this regard suffices to 
listinguish them from the case at bar. Moreover it has 
>een held that transportation charges of a carrier, stand-
ng alone are not lienable, Hayward Lumber & Invest-
nent Co., v. Ross, 32 Cal. App. 2d 455, 90 P. 2d 135, and 
,he "cost theory" can in no wise benefit the carrier here 
Ls the record is totally silent with respect to any proof 
)f the "cost" of the rig being affected by its transporta-
ion. Cf. Landreth Machinery Co. v. Roney, 185 Mo. App. 
~74, 171 S.W. 681. The same must be true with respect 
,o those cases which under dissimiliar statutes have up-
leld liens for transportation charges when the trans-
>orted materials, such as cement, have been used in and 
mhanced the value of constructed improvements, for 
here is a patent distinction, as pointed out in United 
?tates v. Hercules Co., 52 F. 2d 451, between lienable 
ransportation charges for such materials and charges for 
he transportation of heavy equipment which does not be-
:ome a permanent part of an improvement but may be 
1sed thereafter for the same purposes any number of 
imes. 
We believe that any conclusion other than that 
·eached by the trial court in this regard would under-
nine the very purpose and intent of all mechanic's lien 
aws. If it may legitimately be said that this purpose is 
o prevent a property owner from acquiring an unjust 
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enrichment at the expense of innocent laborers or fur-
nishers of supplies, certainly to permit· a common carrier 
a mechanic's lien for charges incident solely to the four 
hundred mile transportation of a drilling rig which never 
was nor ever would be the property of Davis and with 
which the latter had absolutely nothing to do, would 
subvert that purpose and work an undue hardship upon 
this or any other leasehold owner far beyond any attend-
ant benefits which could arise from the temporary pres-
ence of a rig at the drilling site. It is readily observed 
that the transportation was in this instance to the benefit 
only of the driller, and the greater the distance involved, 
the greater became the detriment to the leasehold owner. 
If there were a law expressly subjecting a leasehold 
interest to a lien for transporting a rig 400 miles, 1,000 
miles, or half way across the globe, the owner of such 
interest could then by contract protect himself accord-
ingly. But surely the most grave injustice would result 
to him were he subjected to such charges upon the basis 
of a general mechanic's lien law providing only for 
remedies against him by those whom he should have 
expected to render services. 
We submit that no authority could be cited to support 
the position of Appellant and the extent to which it would 
now have this Court go in sustaining the lien for the 
charges at issue. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant's forced and unnatural construction of the 
Utah law violates fundatnental rules of statutory con-
struction. Its arguments about public policy and liberal 
construction of the statute, if followed and adopted, would 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
-25-
ead to results clearly not contemplated by the Legisla-
;ure. Appellant would have the Court, in the name of 
iberality of construction give a mechanic's lien to a com-
non carrier for transportation charges about which the 
lriller and the owner of the leasehold interest had not 
!ontracted and which bear no relationship to the subject 
natter of that contract. 
We submit that the trial court was correct in holding 
;hat Appellant's charges for transporting the drilling 
rig were not lienable under the Utah Statute. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ANTHONY F. ZARLENGO, 
CLINTON D. VERNON, 
Attorneys for Defendants 
and Respondents. 
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